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"En la Tierra del Ciego, El Tuerto Es Rey" ("In the
Land of the Blind, the One Eyed Person is King"):'
BILINGUALISM AS A DISABILITY
ALFREDO MIRAND8*
The boy waves his hand bashfully, and the teacher tells him to
come to her desk.
"Charles, what do you want?"
"I have to go," the boy whispers, in Spanish, "to the bathroom."
"Charles, speak English."
"I have to go," the boy whispers a little louder, in Spanish,"to
the bathroom."
"English!" the teacher rebukes him, growing impatient. "We speak
English in school, Carlos," she says in Spanish. "You ask in English
or sit down."
The boy, who is maybe ten, and small, looks up at the teacher
with the awe and fear that school children of his age have for authority.
He does not know what to say or do. Suddenly his eyes light up
with a mischievous thought.
"If you don't let me go to the bathroom," the boy exclaims, in
Spanish, "maybe I piss on your shoes." 2
This incident took place in the 1930s long before Jordania Reed was
born. Reed, therefore, did not take it very seriously when the Gilroy
nursing home where she worked imposed an English only requirement
the previous summer.3 Most of the aides at the nursing home, after all,
spoke Spanish and her bilingual skills had helped her land the job at
the Driftwood Convalescent Center. 4 It was natural for Reed to speak
to English-speaking patients in English and to Spanish-speaking patients
in Spanish, but the English-only rule also covered private conversations
by employees that might be overheard by patients.' Reed was worried
but thought, "This is a stupid policy. They could not fire me for speaking
* Professor of Sociology and Ethnic Studies; former Chair of both Chicano Studies and Ethnic
Studies, University of California Riverside. J.D., Stanford University; M.A., Ph.D (Sociology),
University of Nebraska; B.A. (Sociology), Illinois State University. Born in Mexico City; currently
resides in Southern California. Professor Mirand6 is recognized as a leading authority on Chicano
Sociology, the Chicano Family and Gender Roles, and the relationship of Chicano/Latinos to the
Legal and judicial system. He has published more than 50 academic articles and has written a
number of books, including: THE AGE OF CRISES (Harper & Row), LA CHICANA (University of
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l The title of this paper is derived from a Mexican proverb.
2. STAN STEINER, LA RAZA: THE MEXICAN AMERICANS 208 (1970).
3. David Foster, Linguistic Battle Brews in Nation's Factories, Offices, THE PREss-ENTERPRISE,
Sept. 5, 1992, at A-16.
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Spanish." 6 She was wrong, however. Reed was fired on January 3, 1992,
after being "caught" speaking Spanish to co-workers for the second time.
Reed's story is not an isolated incident. Throughout the United States
today a battle is being waged over whether employers can legitimately
impose English-only rules. Opponents of English-only rules and civil rights
groups contend that such rules discriminate against bilingual persons and
violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Equal Protection Clause,
and the First Amendment right to free speech. 7 Proponents of Englishonly rules counter that employers should be able to regulate the conditions
of employment. These proponents contend that employers should have
a right to impose English-only rules, just as they impose dress codes or
other requirements, particularly if there is a legitimate business necessity
for the imposition of the rule. The United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Guidelines stipulate that English-only
rules cannot be imposed except in cases of "business necessity." 8
An underlying thesis of this paper is that there is a need to reformulate
employment discrimination law and the equal protection doctrine to take
into account not only similarities but also internal differences among
protected groups. 9 Just as feminist scholars have been critical of the
liberal model of equality because it is based on the assumption of
homogeneity which holds that equality for women will be attained by
treating them the same as men,' 0 I argue that the liberal model of inequality
is similarly flawed because it assumes that equality will be attained by
treating protected racial/ethnic groups the same as White people. An
added flaw in the dominant liberal view is that the model also assumes
internal homogeneity among protected groups.
In the prevailing liberal model, gender, race, and national origin are
impermissible grounds for discrimination because they are based on immutable, involuntary traits over which the individual has little or no
control. They are impermissible grounds precisely because one cannot
control or change one's race, skin color, or national origin. Language,
on the other hand, is considered mutable. Language is viewed differently
because the decision to speak one language or another is assumed to be
well within the control of the individual. Perhaps it is not surprising
that much of the case law on language discrimination has involved
bilingual persons, given that courts have assumed bilingual persons can
choose which language to speak. Courts have generally not considered

6. Id.
7. Some of the groups that have opposed English-only rules are the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), and the
Employment Law Center (ELC).
8. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 29 C.F.R § 1606.7(b) (1995).
9. This paper focuses on federal employment discrimination claims.
10. See, e.g., Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal
Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
513, 522 (1983); Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity
and the Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference
and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32 (1987).
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English-only rules to be discriminatory because bilingual persons can
speak both languages and they "elect" to speak or not to speak English.
A related assumption is that because bilingual persons are able to speak
both languages, they are being punished not for being who they are
(because of their national origin, color or race) but for inappropriate
behavior (because they elect to speak Spanish)."
In this paper, I examine how English-only rules discriminate on the
grounds of national origin and race. First, English-only rules constitute
a form of national origin and racial discrimination because they are often
pretextual and reflect racial animus toward a particular racial/language
group. Second, if one looks more closely at such rules, they are in effect
"no Spanish" rules, rather than English-only rules. Rather than encouraging the use of English, they are designed to punish the use of
Spanish, a devalued language. Third, though English-only rules are justified on the grounds of business necessity and promoting the use of
English, they are typically applied to bilingual persons who already speak
English. They are applied to individuals who are hired for their bilingual
abilities and who are then punished for speaking Spanish to co-workers.
Fourth, I propose that language is as essential to the sense of individual
and collective identity and sense of self-worth for bilingual persons, who
are discrete and insular minorities in the United States, as skin color is
for other groups. For Latinos in general, and Mexicans in particular,
language is largely an immutable characteristic, like race or skin color
is for African Americans. Finally, English-only rules discriminate on the
grounds of race and national origin because they punish a person's status
rather than his or her behavior. Contrary to the prevailing model, available
research indicates that bilingual persons knowingly and unknowingly switch
from one language to the other, or code-switch, without having full
control over or awareness of the language they speak.
The goals of this paper are fourfold: first, to present an overview of
relevant cases on language discrimination in the work place and to assess
the prevailing legal standard; second, to evaluate dominant conceptions
of equality and inequality and to suggest that such conceptions are
inadequate for understanding the experiences of bilingual persons in the
United States; third, to propose that language has become a proxy for
race and national origin which both permits and legitimizes discrimination
against various Latino and Asian groups; and finally, to propose that
because the dominant society demeans and denigrates the Spanish language, being a Spanish-speaker should be viewed as a disability so employers would be required to provide reasonable accommodation for
Spanish speakers, as they are required to do for other disabled groups.
A.

The Case Law: "We Don't Allow No 'Mesican' Talk"
While not directly addressing the legality of English-only rules, in

11. There is a parallel here to criminal law which generally seeks to punish people for their
acts and not for their status or who they are.
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Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 2 the Fifth Circuit
reversed the district court, holding that the employer had discriminated
against an employee, who was a member of a minority race, by the
practice of segregating the employer's optometry patients.
On April 11, 1969, Mrs. Josephine Chavez filed a Title VII charge of
employment discrimination with the EEOC against S.J. and N. Jay Rogers,
optometrists doing business as "Texas State Optical." Mrs. Chavez's
complaint alleged that she was the only Spanish surnamed person employed
with seven Caucasian females who abused her, and that, though her work
was acceptable, she was terminated because of the friction among the
employees. 3 What is significant about Rogers is that the Fifth Circuit
refused to limit Title VII actions to employment practices which are
specifically proscribed under Title VII.' 4 The issue of whether an employer
intentionally discriminated against an employee was not material to finding
an unlawful employment practice and a hostile work environment. Rogers
was one of the first cases to recognize that a seemingly neutral employment
practice could have an adverse impact on a protected class.' 5 Writing for
the majority, Judge Goldberg remarked:
it is my belief that employees' psychological as well as economic
fringes are statutorily entitled to protection from employer abuse, and
that the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" in
Section 703 is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective
ambit the practice of creating a working
environment heavily charged
6
with ethnic or racial discrimination.'
12. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
13. Id. at 236.
14. Id.
15. Title VII, section 703(a)(1) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is concerned not only with intentional
discrimination but with employment. practices, policies, and conditions that may have a disparate
impact on the treatment of classes of workers. While disparate treatment claims require that the
plaintiff prove the employer intentionally discriminated, intent is not relevant to a disparate impact
case.
Under both disparate-treatment and adverse impact theories of liability, the burden is on the
plaintiff to prove discrimination. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973),
and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981), the United States
Supreme Court established the allocation of the burden of production and the order of presentation
of proof in Title VII discriminatory treatment cases.
The plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima
facie case of racial discrimination. Plaintiff must show that she was qualified for the position and
"rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Burdine,
450 U.S. at 253. The plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she
was qualified for the position, (3) she was demoted or discharged, and (4) the position was ultimately
filled by a White person. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Under the McDonnell Douglas/
Burdine standard, the establishment of a prima facie case creates in effect a presumption of unlawful
discrimination and the burden shifts to the defendant to produce evidence that the adverse employment
actions were taken for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. Thus, the defendant must "set forth,
through the introduction of admissible evidence which if believed by the trier of fact would support
a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the basis for the action." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 25455. Although the burden of production shifts to the defendant once the plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case, "[tihe ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally
discriminated ... remains at all times with the plaintiff." Id. at 253.
Though petitioner's reason for rejection may be sufficient to meet the prima facie case, the
inquiry does not end here. On remand, the plaintiff "must be afforded a fair opportunity" to
show that the petitioner's stated reason for respondent's rejection was in fact pretext. McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 793.
16. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
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One of the earliest cases involving an English-only rule in an employment
context was Saucedo v. Brothers Well Service, Inc.,' 7 in which the United
States District Court, Southern District of Texas, held that unlawful
employment discrimination occurred when a Mexican-American employee
was discharged for speaking two words of Spanish on the job, while a
White employee was retained even though he was guilty of engaging in
a fight during the same incident. 8
At the time he was discharged on May 25, 1972, John Saucedo had
been employed by Brothers Well Service (Brothers), a small family owned
business operating "workover rigs" in the El Campo area near Houston,
for approximately a month and a half as a "floor man."' 9 "A workover
rig is essentially a drilling rig used to work over wells with declining
production. '" 20 Though there was considerable turnover in the position
of floor man and the wages were low, Saucedo's employment history
and demeanor were satisfactory and he was "a reliable, hard-working
employee who had done a good job for Brothers before his discharge
job were it not for the unfortunate
and would have continued to do a good
''

event made the basis of this

suit.

21

A significant consideration in the ruling is that Brothers did not have
a general English-only rule. When Saucedo was first hired, he was informed by his immediate supervisor, John Erdelt, that "Doc" Holliday
"didn't allow any 'Mesican' talk. ' 22 Erdelt added that as far as he was
concerned any one could speak any language they wanted on ' the
job,
23
but that Holliday "simply did not tolerate any 'Mesican' talk.
At the time of the discharge, Saucedo was not reworking a well but
was on a rig supervised by Holliday which was in Brothers' shop for
repairs. 24 When ordered to bring a large metal part to another MexicanAmerican worker, Steve Perez, Saucedo brought the part and uttered
two Spanish words, asking Perez where he wanted him to place the part.
Holliday overheard Saucedo's comment and told him that he had just
"resigned." He told Saucedo to put on his street clothes and drove him
into town. 25 When Perez sought to intervene by protesting the rule and
26
its enforcement, he was physically assaulted by Holliday.
The Saucedo court found that a rule stating that Spanish cannot be
spoken on the job obviously has a disparate impact on Mexican-American
employees and that Brothers had failed to prove, by credible evidence,
that it actually had uniformly enforced such a rule or that there was

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

464 F. Supp. 919 (S.D. Tex. 1979).
Id. at 922.
Id. at 920.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 921.
Saucedo, 464 F. Supp. at 921.
Id.
Id. at 921-22.
Id. at 922.
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any business necessity for the rule. 27 The Court noted, however, that its
opinion did not hold that an employer, or this specific employer, may
not institute an English-only requirement in certain situations.28
In another Texas case, Garcia v. Gloor,29 the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the dismissal of a Mexican-American employee who was
fired for speaking Spanish in the workplace. Hector Garcia, twenty-four
years of age at the time, was native-born but bilingual and had always
spoken Spanish in his own household. 0
Garcia was employed as a salesman by Gloor Lumber and Supply
(Gloor) in Brownsville, Texas. His duties included stocking and keeping
his department in order, assisting other salesmen, and selling lumber,
hardware and supplies. 3 Gloor had a rule which prohibited employees
from speaking Spanish on the job unless they were speaking with a
Spanish-speaking client.12 Though born in the United States, Garcia's
primary language was Spanish and he testified that he found it difficult
to observe the English-only rule.33 On June 10, 1975, when asked a
question by another Mexican-American employee about an item that had
been requested by a customer, Garcia responded in Spanish that the item
was not available. Alton Gloor, an officer and stockholder of the company, overheard the comment and Garcia was discharged shortly there34
after.
Garcia had recently been complimented by management for his work
and had received a $250 bonus a month before his dismissal. 5 Gloor
maintained, nonetheless, that he was a problem worker, that the compliments were provided as an incentive to improve his performance, and
that the bonus was given to all employees.3 6 Though seven of the eight
salesmen employed by Gloor in 1975 were Hispanic and bilingual and
seventy-five percent of the population in the business area was Hispanic,
37
the company felt the rule was justified by business reasons.
The narrow issue decided by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was
"whether the English-only rule as applied to Mr. Garcia imposed a
discriminatory condition of employment. 3 8 The Fifth Circuit affirmed
the lower court's denial of class action certification on the grounds that
the class was not sufficiently numerous to meet the requirement. The
court also concluded that the English-only rule as applied to Hector
Garcia did not discriminate on the basis of national origin.3 9

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. at 919-20.
618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
Id. at 266.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gloor, 618 F.2d at 266.
Id.
Id. at 267.
Id.
Id. at 271.

Winter 1996]

BILINGUALISM AS A DISABILITY

In interpreting the statute, the court started with the "plain meaning"
of the statute "without pausing to consider whether a statute differently
' 4
framed would yield results more consonant with fairness and reason."
Emphasizing that Garcia was fully bilingual, the court concluded that
"[h]e chose deliberately to speak Spanish instead of English while actually
at work," and ' 41"was permitted to speak the language he preferred during
work breaks."
On August 28, 1981, Valentine Jurado was discharged as a disc jockey
by Los Angeles radio station KIIS-FM (KIIS) after he was instructed to
broadcast only in English and refused. 42 Jurado, a radio announcer of
Mexican and Native-American descent and bilingual in Spanish and English, began working as a disc jockey at KIIS under the name of "Val
Valentine" in 1977. 41 Jurado broadcast in English-only for several years
until at the request of the then Program Director, he began to use some
"street Spanish" phrases and words in an effort to attract Hispanic
listeners. 44 A consultant later decided that the bilingual format actually
hurt the radio station's ratings because it confused listeners as to KIIS'
programming, since the other programs were in English. 45 After examining
the station's Arbitron ratings which showed no increase in the program's
target Hispanic audience, on August 27, 1981, the new Program Director,
Donald Benson, directed Jurado to stop using Spanish on the air. 46 What
happened next is disputed. Jurado contends that he was fired; the station
says he quit. For the purpose of the summary judgment motion, however,47
KIIS admitted that he was fired for refusing to comply with the request.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Jurado's race and national
origin discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C § 1981 and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,4 and his claims for breach of a collective
bargaining agreement under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 49 affirming a lower court summary judgment motion on
behalf of the defendants. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff had
failed to establish a prima facie disparate treatment case because the
English-only order was motivated by market conditions rather than racial
considerations and because he failed to show that he engaged in any
activity protected by Title VII from retaliation by employer. Finally, the
court rejected Jurado's only disparate impact claim that the English-only
requirement somehow disadvantaged Hispanics because plaintiff "was
fluently bilingual and could easily conform to the order." 50

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 268.
Id.
Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1408.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1988).
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1412.
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The Ninth Circuit also rejected Jurado's claim that the station's failure
to prohibit radio personality Rick Dees, who is Caucasian, "from using
Spanish on his program showed unequal treatment based on race." 5' A
segment of Dees' show featured fictional comic personalities some of
whom used Spanish.5 2 The court asserted that the fact that the station
permitted Dees to use Spanish, but did not permit Jurado to do so, was
not evidence that the station intended to discriminate against Jurado or
to place him at some disadvantage because the shows have different
programming and different audiences: "[d]iscriminatory motive cannot
be divined by comparing individual decisions about dissimilar programs.""
In Gutierrez v. Municipal Court,14 however, the Ninth Circuit held
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering a preliminary
injunction enjoining enforcement of an English-only requirement enacted
by the Southeast Judicial District of the Los Angeles Municipal Court.
The lower court did not abuse its discretion because the plaintiff, Alva
Gutierrez, had established "both a likelihood of success on the merits
and the possibility of irreparable injury . . .-.
Gutierrez was one of several bilingual Hispanic-Americans employed
by the Los Angeles Municipal Court as a deputy clerk, and had held
her position since 1978. In addition to their other duties, bilingual clerks
are expected to translate for the non-English speaking public. In March
1984, however, the municipal court enacted a new personnel rule which
prohibited employees from using a language other than English, except
when acting as translators. In December 1984, the rule was amended to
exclude conversations which took place during breaks or lunch:5 6
The English language shall be spoken by all court employees during
regular working hours while attending to assigned work duties, unless
an employee is translating for the non-English-speaking public. This
rule does not apply to employees while on their lunch hour or work
7
breaks.

The new rule greatly upset Gutierrez and the other bilingual clerks. 58
Gutierrez filed a complaint with the EEOC, and in March of 1985 she
brought suit against the municipal judges, seeking monetary damages,
injunctive relief, and attorney fees.59 Gutierrez contended that the Englishonly rule: (1) constituted racial and national origin discrimination with
regard to terms or condition of employment in violation of Title VII; 60
(2) denied her the right to make contracts equally with White persons

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 1410.
Id.
Id.
838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
Id. at 1036.
Id.
Id. at 1037.
Id.
Id. at 1036.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1988).
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in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and (3) denied her equal protection
of the law and infringed upon her First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. 6' Furthermore, she sought damages through 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
and 1985(3).62
In addition to finding that Gutierrez was entitled to a preliminary
injunction, the Ninth Circuit found that the municipal judges were not
entitled to absolute legislative immunity, that the District Court had
jurisdiction over the claim, and that qualified immunity was not a defense
to a claim of intentional discrimination. 63 The case was remanded to
determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleged intentional discrimination to avoid summary judgment. 64
A Ninth Circuit panel consisting of Circuit Judges Browning, Tang,6
and Reinhardt subsequently voted to deny the petition for rehearing.
Circuit Judges Thompson and O'Scannlain joined Circuit Judge Kozinski
in dissenting from the order rejecting the suggestion for rehearing en
banc. The dissenters argued that the case "cried out for en banc consideration" because the panel opinion created a direct conflict with the
Fifth Circuit opinion in Garcia v. Gloor and the Ninth Circuit holding
66
in Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp.
The dissent in Gutierrez would eventually prevail as the majority view
in Garcia v. Spun Steak Co.,67 an opinion authored by Circuit Judge
O'Scannlain, one of the Gutierrez dissenters. In Spun Steak, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that employees who spoke both Spanish
and English failed to show that the English-only requirement imposed
by their employer had a significant adverse affect on the terms, conditions,
or privileges of their employment. 68 Spun Steak further stated that the
employees failed to show that there was a genuine issue of material fact
did not speak English were adversely affected
as to whether employees who
69
by the English-only rule.
Spun Steak Company is a small South San Francisco producer of
poultry and meat products for wholesale distribution. 70 Twenty-four of
the thirty-three workers are Spanish speaking. Two of the employees
speak no English and the remainder "have varying degrees of proficiency
in English." ' 7' About two-thirds of the employees are production line
workers or involved in the production process. 72 The plaintiffs Priscilla
Garcia and Maricela Buitrago, worked on the production line standing

61. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1036.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 861 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490 U.S.
1016 (1989).
66. Id. at 1188-89.
67. 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2726 (1994).
68. Id. at 1485-86.
69. Id. at 1484.
70. Id. at 1483.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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before a conveyor belt, removing poultry or other meat products from
the belt and placing them into cases or trays for resale." The work is
done individually.
Both Garcia and Buitrago were bilingual in Spanish
74
and English.
Employees spoke Spanish freely to co-workers until September 1990,
when Spun Steak began to investigate the possibility of requiring workers
to speak only English in the workplace. This investigation came about
after Spun Steak allegedly received complaints that workers were using
their "bilingual capabilities" to harass and insult other workers. 7 1 Specifically, the company maintained it received complaints that Garcia and
Buitrago had made derogatory racist comments in Spanish which
were
76
aimed at an African-American and a Chinese-American worker.
The president of the company, Kenneth Bertelson, concluded that an
English-only rule would promote racial harmony and would enhance
worker safety because some workers who did not speak Spanish claimed
they were "distracted" by the use of Spanish when they were operating
machinery. 77 An additional consideration for imposing the English-only
rule is that the U.S.D.A. plant inspector did not speak Spanish and
would not be able to receive product-related concerns in Spanish. 78
In November of 1990, Garcia and Buitrago received warning letters
for speaking Spanish in the workplace. 79 The plaintiffs and Local 115
filed charges with the EEOC on May 6, 1991. After an investigation the
EEOC concluded that "there is reasonable cause to believe [Spun Steak]
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, with
respect to its adoption of an English-only rule and with respect to
retaliation when [Garcia, Buitrago, and Local 115] complained." 0 Garcia,
Buitrago, and Local 115 filed suit on behalf of all Spanish-speaking
employees, alleging that the English-only rule violated Title VII. The
district court denied Spun Steak's motion for summary judgment and
granted the employees' motion for summary judgment. The lower court
concluded that the English-only policy had an adverse disparate impact
on Hispanic workers unjustified by a sufficient business necessity, and
was therefore in violation of Title VII.81 Spun Steak appealed and the
82
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.
Spun Steak was a disparate-impact case. Employees did not claim that
Spun Steak intentionally discriminated against them, but rather that the
English-only policy had a discriminatory impact. The employees asserted

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. One wonders how people who do not speak or understand Spanish would know that
they were being insulted or subjected to racist comments.
76. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1483-84.
81. Id.at 1484.
82. Id.at 1490.
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that the policy imposed a burdensome condition of employment exclusively
upon Hispanic workers and denied them a privilege of employment enjoyed
by other workers.8 3 Most English-only employment discrimination claims,
however, have been based on both adverse-impact and disparate-treatment
theories. 8 4 Gutierrez charged that the English-only rule, by its very terms,
has an adverse impact on Hispanics because they constitute the vast
majority of bilingual persons in the Southeast Judicial District of Los
Angeles and because their ethnic identity is linked to their language. 81
She also claimed that despite its neutral pretext, the rule was intentionally
86
adopted for the purpose of discriminating against Hispanics.
The earlier challenges to English-only rules appear to have been based
on disparate treatment, although they indirectly address the question of
disparate impact. In Rogers the court opted for an expansive interpretation
of Title VII and concluded that even if the discriminatory treatment or
classification is not directed at an employee, an employee is statutorily
protected from exposure to a work environment that is charged with
87
ethnic or racial discrimination.
B.

Analysis of the Case Law

1. "English-Only" or "No Spanish"?
To make a prima facie disparate-impact case, a plaintiff must show
that a seemingly neutral practice or policy has a significant adverse impact
on members of a protected class.8 8 Making a prima facie case has not
been an onerous burden. English-only rules have been invoked in areas
where there is a high concentration of Hispanics and where Hispanics
make up the vast majority of employees that are affected by the rule.
In a disparate-treatment case the plaintiff must merely present evidence
sufficient to give rise to an inference of discrimination,8 9 but in a disparate
impact context, the initial burden is higher and before the burden shifts
to the defendant, a plaintiff "must actually prove the discriminatory
impact at issue .
,"90In the English-only context, it is clear that if
the policy has an adverse impact, it will be on employees of Hispanic
origin.

83. Id. at 1485.
84. See Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490 U.S.
1016 (1989); Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987); Garcia v. Gloor, 618
F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 113 (1981).
85. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1037.
86. Id. The plaintiff in Jurado argued that KIIS's English-only order was racially motivated and
that he was dismissed in violation of Title VII based on a disparate treatment theory and that the
station's failure to prohibit a white disc jockey from using Spanish showed unequal treatment based
on race. Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1409-10. The plaintiff in Gloor similarly argued that Gloor's Englishonly rule subjected him to disparate treatment and that the rule had a discriminatory impact even
if there was no discriminatory intent. Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270.
87. Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (1971).
88. Rose v. Wells Fargo, 902 F.2d 1417, 1424 (9th Cir. 1990).
89. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
90. Rose, 902 F.2d at 1421.
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If one looks more closely, English-only rules are in effect "no Spanish"
rules. The most extreme example was Saucedo where the employer had
not adopted an English-only rule but Saucedo was fired, nonetheless, for
uttering two words of Spanish. 9' The court concluded that a rule prohibiting speaking Spanish on the job obviously has a disparate impact
on Mexican-American employees, and that Brothers had failed to prove
such a rule
by a preponderance of evidence that it uniformly enforced
92
rule.
the
for
necessity
business
a
was
or that there
Gloor Lumber prohibited employees from speaking Spanish on the job,
but employees were allowed to speak Spanish during their breaks. 93 Spun
Steak's policy was that "only English be spoken in connection with
work" but it added that during lunch breaks employees "are obviously
free to speak Spanish if they wish." 94 The rule also admonished workers
"not to use your fluency in Spanish in a fashion which may lead other
employees to suffer humiliation." 95 This was obviously aimed at Garcia
and Buitrago who received warning letters for speaking Spanish, were
not permitted to work together for two months, and had allegedly made
derogatory comments in Spanish about co-workers. 96 Jurado was dismissed
by KIIS because he was said to have refused to abide by an order to
"stop speaking Spanish on the air, assuring Jurado continued employment
if he complied." 97 Finally, the Municipal Court in Gutierrez, promulgated
a personnel rule "which forbade employees to speak any language other
than English, except when acting as translators." 9 8 Though ostensibly
prohibiting the use of any language other than English, the rule was
clearly aimed at bilingual Hispanic deputy court clerks. 99
2. English-Only as Discrimination Against Bilingual Employees
Perhaps what is most ironic about English-only or "no Spanish" rules
is that they are aimed at and have had an adverse impact on bilingual
employees as opposed to monolingual Spanish-speakers. The refusal to
hire applicants who cannot speak English would be clearly discriminatory,
if knowledge of English was not necessary for performing the job.1°° The
targets of "no Spanish" rules, however, have been persons who can
conform to the English-only requirement. Spun Steak exempted members
of the clean-up crew from the English-only policy,' 0' and Gloor's English-

91. Saucedo v. Brothers Well Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919, 922 (S.D. Tex. 1979). This was in
violation of Supervisor Doc Holliday's ad hoc "No 'Mesican' talk" rule.
92. Id.
93. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1980).
94. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1993).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1987).
98. Gutierrez v. Municipal Court, 838 F.2d 1031, 1036 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot, 490
U.S. 1016 (1989). The rule was amended to exclude conversations during breaks or lunchtime. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Gloor, 618 F.2d at 269.
101. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483.
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only rule did not apply to workers who worked outside in the lumber
yard and did not speak English.1°2
English-only rules are significant because they seek to regulate the use
of Spanish by persons who are hired precisely because of their bilingual
abilities. Bilingual employees are thereby placed in a "Catch-22" dilemma.
They are hired because they are bilingual and are required to translate
for Spanish-speaking clientele. However, these same people are prohibited
from speaking Spanish when interacting with co-workers. Bilingual skills
were essential job skills in Gloor, Jurado, Gutierrez, 03 and presumably

Rogers. 04
Spun Steak and Saucedo differ because workers were not hired because
of their bilingual abilities. 05 Yet in neither setting was knowledge of
English necessary for employment. Significantly, Spun Steak had never
required applicants to speak or understand English as a condition of
employment. ,o6
3. Business Necessity or Pretext?
The ultimate issue to be decided by courts is whether English-only
rules result from a genuine business necessity or are a pretext for discrimination on the grounds of national origin and race. In Saucedo and
Rogers the defendants did not present very compelling arguments for the
differential treatment of Spanish-speaking employees, 107 however, the other
cases present fairly elaborate justifications for the imposition of Englishonly rules. 0
In attempting to justify firing Garcia based on deficient work performance, Gloor gave several other reasons for the articulation of the
policy:
English-speaking customers objected to communications between employees that they could not understand; pamphlets and trade literature
were in English and were not available in Spanish, so it was important
for employees to be fluent in English apart from conversations with
English-speaking customers; if employees who normally spoke Spanish
off the job were required to speak English on the job at all times
and not only when waiting on English-speaking customers, they would
improve their English; and the rule would permit supervisors, who

102. Gloor, 618 F.2d at 266.
103. Gloor, 618 F.2d at 266; Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1408; Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1036.
104. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 234. As the only Spanish-surnamed employee, Mrs. Chavez's bilingual
skills would be useful in dealing with the Spanish-speaking clients who were segregated by Texas
State Optical.
105. See Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1480; Saucedo, 464 F. Supp. at 919. In Saucedo, Saucedo's
level of proficiency in English was not clear from the record. Because approximately half of Brothers'
employees were Mexican-American and only 30 percent of the general population in the area is
Mexican-American, one could infer that English speaking ability is not an important element of
the work required. Saucedo, 464 F. Supp. at 919.
106. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1483.
107. Saucedo, 464 F. Supp. at 919; Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238-39.
108. See, e.g., Gloor, 618 F.2d at 267; Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406, 1410 (9th
Cir. 1987).
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The district court and the Fifth Circuit both concluded that the English0
only rule was motivated by business reasons, rather than discrimination."l
While these business reasons may appear at first blush to be valid, they
do not stand up well under closer scrutiny. The first rationale-that
English-speaking customers "objected" to the use of Spanish-does not
stand up well as a business rationale when one considers that seventyfive percent of the population in the business area is Hispanic. English
speakers are thus clearly a minority of the clientele."' It is also significant
12
that thirty-one of the thirty-nine Gloor employees were Hispanic." The
second rationale-that it was "important for employees to be fluent in
English"-is also not very compelling when one considers that Gloor
hired some employees who spoke Spanish to work in the yard. Moreover,
Garcia and the other Hispanic salesmen were bilingual and already spoke
English." 3 Garcia was born in the United States and educated in Texas.
The problem was not that Garcia was not fluent in English, but that
responding to a co-worker in Spanish
he was "overheard" by Mr. Gloor
4
available."
not
was
item
that an
In Jurado, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's summary judgment in favor of defendant. The court held that Jurado failed to establish
that an order to speak only English on the air was racially motivated.
Moreover, he could not prove that he was discharged based on discriminatory employment criteria for both his disparate treatment and disparate
impact claims."' The business rationale for the move away from the
bilingual format was threefold: 1) there had been no increase in the
program's target Hispanic population; 2) speaking Spanish actually hurt
KIIS' ratings; and 3) the bilingual format might "confuse listeners" about
the station's programming." 6 Although the bilingual format was initially
proposed by the station manager, Jurado would occasionally use "street"
words and phrases rather than Spanish." 7 Street phrases would appeal
to bilingual listeners, but not to Spanish-language listeners." 8 Ironically,
the station did not prohibit street phrases used by some of the fictional
comic call-in personalities on the Rick Dees Show."19 It is not clear why
the use of a Spanish word or phrase by Jurado would confuse listeners
about the station programming any more than Dees' fictional call-in
personalities. Jurado's show was clearly in English with a sprinkling of
Spanish.

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Gloor, 618 F.2d at 267.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 267.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 266.
Jurado, 813 F.2d at 1411, 1412.
Id. at 1410.
Id. at 1408.
Id.
Id. at 1410.
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In Gutierrez, the defendant Los Angeles Municipal Court Judges offered
five justifications for imposing the English-only rule on bilingual clerks:
1. [t]he United States is an English-speaking country and California
an English-speaking state ....
2. [t]he rule is necessary to prevent the workplace from turning into
a "Tower of Babel . ..

3.
4.
not
5.

."

[tjhe rule is necessary to promote racial harmony ....
[t]he English-only rule is necessary because several supervisors do
speak or understand Spanish ....
20
[t]he English-only rule is required by the California Constitution.

The Ninth Circuit carefully examined and rejected each of these justifications as not being sufficiently compelling to meet the business necessity
exception. In evaluating these justifications, however, the Ninth Circuit
stressed that "business necessity" means more than "business purpose"
so that "the justification must be sufficiently compelling to override the
discriminatory impact

.

,,12
"...

"In addition, the practice or rule must

effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve, and there
''122
must be available no acceptable less discriminatory alternative ....
That the United States and California are English-speaking political
entities is self-evident but provides little, if any, justification for the
English-only rule. 123 The prohibition of intra-employee Spanish communication did little to advance the state interest of having a single language
system, especially since part of the regular duties of the bilingual clerks
is to communicate in Spanish with certain members of the non-English
speaking public. 124 The claim that permitting the use of Spanish or another
language in the workplace is disruptive is offered without any supporting
evidence. 125 Moreover, "[s]ince Spanish is already being spoken in the
Clerk's office, to non-English-speaking Hispanic citizens, part of the
'babel' that appellants purport to fear is necessary to the normal press
26
of court business."1

The assertion that the rule is necessary to promote racial harmony was
made without any evidence of the inappropriate use of Spanish to denigrate
or belittle non-Spanish-speaking employees. 27 In fact, the court pointed
to evidence that racial hostility had increased because Spanish-speaking
employees felt demeaned and belittled by the rule. There was also evidence
of racially discriminatory remarks being directed toward Spanish-speaking
2
employees by non-Spanish-speaking workers.
The court held the justification for a "no Spanish" rule because several
supervisors did not speak or understand Spanish to be both illogical and

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1042-44.
Id.
Id. at 1041-42.
Id. at 1042.
Id.
Id.
Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1042.
Id.
Id.
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unpersuasive.129 The clerks were hired because they were bilingual and
were required to speak Spanish "because Spanish is the primary tongue
of the majority . . . of the public who use the courts in the Southwest
Judicial District."' 3 0 The English-only rule does nothing to enhance the
supervisors' ability to control or evaluate "the dissemination of information to the public." 3 ' Although'requiring the supervisors to be bilingual
would solve the problem, the court did not discuss this solution.
Finally, the court rejected the argument that the English-only rule is
required by an amendment to the California Constitution mandating the
use of English in all official state business.3 2 A fair reading of Section
6 does not provide that English has to be spoken when employees are
communicating with one another, or that English-only rules should be
the official policy of the state.'3 3 Section 6 may have some applicability
to official government communications, when and if it is implemented
by the legislature; otherwise, it appears to be mostly a symbolic statement. 3 4 Finally, "the adoption of a constitutional provision or a state
statute does not ipso facto create a business necessity."' 35
Both the defendant's justification for the English-only rule and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' analysis of the business necessity exception
are less compelling in Spun Steak than Gutierrez. Spun Steak maintained
that an English-only rule would promote racial harmony in the workplace
and would enhance worker safety because some of the workers who did
not know or understand Spanish claimed that the use of Spanish "distracted them while they were operating machinery .... 1136 The use of
English also enhanced product quality because the U.S.D.A. inspector
spoke only English and could not understand a product related concern
raised in Spanish.'7

129. Id. at 1043.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. Article III, § 6 of the California Constitution, added by the voters as a ballot initiative
in 1986, provides:
(a) Purpose ... English is the common language of the people of the United
States of America and the State of California. This section is intended to preserve,
protect and strengthen the English language, and not to supersede any of the rights
guaranteed to the people of this Constitution.
(b) .. . English is the official language of the State of California.
(c) Enforcement ... The Legislature shall enforce this section by appropriate
legislation. The legislature and officials of the State of California shall take all
steps necessary to insure that the role of English as the common language of the
State of California is preserved and enhanced. The Legislature shall make no law
which diminishes or ignores the role of English as the common language of the
State of California.
(d) . . . Any person who is a resident of or doing business in the State of California
shall have standing to sue the State of California to enforce this section ....
CAL. Co NSrT. art. III, § 6 (emphasis added).
133. Gutierrez, 838 F.2d at 1043-44.
134. Id. at 1044.
135. Id. (emphasis added). See also Dothard v. Rawlings, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.14 (1977).
136. Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1993).
137. Id.
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Notwithstanding the allegations against the plaintiffs, the first justification was made with very little evidence to support it.' s It is not clear
that the English-only rule was designed to meet business necessity. Even
assuming racial tension, there are less restrictive alternatives available,
such as reprimanding or dismissing workers who make racist and derogatory comments about other workers. Prohibiting workers from speaking a language that they feel comfortable using may serve to exacerbate
racial tension, especially among workers who do not use Spanish to make
derogatory comments about other workers. It is also important to remember that most of Spun Steak's workers were Spanish-speaking and
that two workers did not speak English. 3 9 As in Gloor and Gutierrez,
the behavior of bilingual workers, who constitute the majority, was being
altered to allay the concerns of a minority of monolingual workers.
The second concern, that the English-only rule promotes worker safety,
is unsupported, and there are less restrictive alternatives available such
as providing ear plugs for workers or not permitting workers to talk on
the line at all. What about the monolingual Spanish worker? Is that
person also distracted when she hears English spoken?' 40 Because speaking
and understanding English are not conditions of employment, what happens if Spun Steak hires more monolingual Spanish-speakers? Remarkably,
the court concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether the line employee who spoke no English was adversely affected
by the English-only rule.' 4'
The last justification-that the use of English would enhance product
quality because the U.S.D.A. inspector does not speak or understand
Spanish-is illogical . 42 Monolingual Spanish speakers are incapable of
voicing their complaints in English, and bilingual workers certainly could
express their safety concerns to the inspector in English. The Englishonly rule is, therefore, irrelevant to this concern. The problem could be
resolved by having a bilingual inspector, but this is not necessary since
all but one of the Spanish-speaking workers are bilingual.
C. English-Only, Bilingualism, and the Issue of "Choice"
Courts that have decided that English-only rules are not discriminatory
have articulated a consistent model of language usage and language choice.
This model views language use and language choice through monolingual
lenses. The model is also largely unsupported either by social science and
linguistic research or by subjective evidence. 4 3

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. The other monolingual Spanish-speaker was unaffected by the policy because he was part
of the "clean-up" crew and exempted from the English-only rule. Id. at 1483.
141. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1488.
142. See id. at 1483.
143. In the typical disparate impact case, the plaintiff proves discriminatory impact of selection
criteria by showing statistical disparities between the representation of members in the qualified
applicant group and those in the relevant segment of the work force. See Wards Cove Packing
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One of the earliest and clearest articulations of the model is found in
Garcia v. Gloor.' 44 Hector Garcia argued that it was discriminatory to
prohibit him from speaking Spanish because it was the language with
which he was most familiar and this prohibition denied him a privilege
of employment enjoyed by workers who are most comfortable speaking
English.141 Garcia asserted that this constituted discrimination on the basis
of national origin because national origin influences or determines language preference.'4 Garcia argued, in fact, that for Mexican Americans,
identification
the Spanish language is the most important aspect of ethnic
147
and is for them, like skin color or race is to others.
However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument.
The court held that the action was not discriminatory because Garcia
was fully bilingual and "chose deliberately to speak Spanish instead of
English while actually at work."' 148 The court further noted that the
authorities cited failed to give a person the right to speak a particular
language at work. 49 "[T]he rules of the workplace are made [either
through] collective bargaining or ... the employer."' 50 Garcia was bilingual and was hired precisely because of his bilingual abilities and when
dealing with customers was expected to speak in the language preferred
by the customer."' The English-only rule, the court reasoned, was simply
an additional restriction on his language preference, in that when not
serving customers, he was expected to speak English on the job. 5 2 Judge
Rubin noted that even if there was no business necessity for the rule,
Title VII "does not prohibit all arbitrary employment practices," only

Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650 (1988). However, whether the disparate impact is on the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, determining if the protected group has been adversely
affected may depend on subjective factors which are not readily quantified. See Garcia v. Spun
Steak, 998 F.2d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1983). The fact that the effects are subjective does not lessen
the burden on the plaintiff to prove disparate impact of the policy on the protected group.
144. 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
145. Id. at 268.
146. Id. at 267.
147. Id. at 266. My own experience is consistent with this view. At the law school, for example,
I always greeted Mexican employees in Spanish. The janitors who worked in the law school building
at night and one of the cashiers in the law lounge were Mexican and a special bonding occurred
when I talked to them in Spanish. The bonding is stronger than it would be in Mexico because
in an English-dominated country and university, our linguistic difference sets us off from the
dominant group. In Mexico, they would be employees and I would be a student, but in the United
States, our nationality and language become the basis for the bonding and enables us to transcend
educational and class differences. I doubt that many other people greet them or acknowledge them.
Jos6 Lim6n has observed that bilingual speakers often use language choice to express political or
cultural values. Jos6 Lim6n, El Meeting: History, Folk Spanish, and Ethnic Nationalism in a Chicano
Student Community, in SPANISH IN THE UNITED STATES: SOCIOLINGUISTIC ASPECTS 301 (J. Amastae

& L. Elias-Olivares eds., 1982).
I have experienced similar bonding in other settings with maids in hotels, busboys, waiters, workers
at the car wash and other employees. Almost all of the employees at the local car washes are
Latino, whereas the customers are white. It is a very strange feeling for me to go to a car wash.
I feelout of place, as if I should grab a rag and start drying cars.
148. Gloor, 618 F.2d at 268.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 268-69.
151. Id. at 269.
152. Id.
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specific impermissible discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.' 53
Save for religion, the discriminations on which the Act focuses its
laser of prohibition are those that are either beyond the victim's power
to alter, [citation omitted] or that impose a burden on an employee
on one of the prohibited bases. No one can change his place of birth
(national origin), the place of birth of his forebears (national origin),
his race or fundamental sexual characteristics.' 54
Employers are thus prohibited from discriminating on the basis of immutable, protected, characteristics such as race or national origin, but
hiring policies that distinguish on other grounds such as grooming codes
or length of hair, or the sign of the zodiac a person was born under
are not prohibited.'5 5
The Ninth Circuit used the same theoretical justification in ruling against
the bilingual disc jockey in Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp. 5 6 The Court
noted that Jurado had broadcast in English for several years before going
to the bilingual format and did not dispute his bilingual proficiency.157
He therefore "had the ability to conform to the English-only order, but
chose not to do so.""' Citing Garcia v. Gloor, the court concluded that
"[an employer can properly enforce a limited, reasonable and businessrelated, English-only rule against an employee who can readily comply
with the rule and who voluntarily chooses not to observe it . ...

"

In Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., the Ninth Circuit said the crux of the
dispute was not whether Hispanic workers would disproportionately bear
any adverse effects of the policy, because it was agreed that they would,
but whether the policy causes any adverse effects at all and, if it does,
whether the effects are significant.' 60 The court noted that the ability to
converse on the job is a privilege of employment, especially among
assembly line workers, and a privilege by definition is extended and
restricted at the employer's discretion.' 6' In this case, the employer had
the prerogative to define the privilege narrowly. 62
When the privilege is defined at its narrowest (as merely the ability
to speak on the job), we cannot conclude that those employees fluent
in both English and Spanish are adversely impacted by the policy.
Because they are able to speak English, bilingual employees can engage
in conversation on the job. It is axiomatic that "the language a person

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Gloor, 618 F.2d at 269.
Id.
Id.
813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1411.
Id. at 1411.
Id.
Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993).
Id.at 1487.
Id.
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a

The court found there was no disparate impact because the individual
employee could still comply with the English-only rule and retain the
privilege of speaking, as long as the rule is one the employee can readily
observe and the decision to not observe was a question of individual

preference. 164
While an in-depth analysis of research and theories of bilingualism and
language usage is well beyond the scope of this paper, I propose that
the dominant model invoked by courts, which assumes that bilingual
persons deliberately "choose" to speak Spanish and to violate Englishonly rules, is supported neither by empirical statistical studies nor personal
experience. I propose that the dominant view is based on a conception
of language use which treats bilingual persons as two separate monolingual
persons and fails to understand the nuance and complexity of the bilingual
experience. As a bilingual person, I can certainly speak to monolingual
Spanish speakers in Spanish and readily switch to English with monolingual English speakers without missing a beat, as the bilingual clerks
did in Gutierrez or the salesmen in Gloor, but my interaction with
bilinguals is very different. When I speak with bilingual people, I not
only go back and forth between Spanish and English, but I combine
them in a unique way which linguists have termed "code-switching." My
thesis, based on personal experience and reading of literature on bilingualism, is relatively simple. First, I contend that bilinguals interact
differently with other bilinguals than they do with monolingual Spanish
or English speakers. Second, I argue that because language usage is
contextual, in assessing disparate impact, courts must look not only to
the language abilities of workers, but also to the context within which
language usage occurs. Third, bilingual speakers switch back and forth
between English and Spanish, combining the two languages in a complex
and unique communicative process that cannot be classified clearly as
Spanish or English. Finally, bilingual speakers cannot readily conform
to English-only rules as courts contend. For fully bilingual persons, the
use of language is an automatic, relatively unconscious act.
Amado Padilla and Hyekyung Sung have proposed a theoretical framework for looking at bilingual education based on principles from cognitive
psychology. 65 The model posits that information moves through three
memory systems-sensory memory (SM), short-term memory (STM), and
long-term memory (LTM).' 66 All stimulus from the environment first
enters sensory memory, then based on its saliency it may be transferred
to STM or LTM. Once information enters LTM, it is presumptively

163. Id. (citing Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1982)).
164. Id. (citation omitted).
165. See Amado M. Padilla & Hyekyung Sung, A Theoretical and Pedagogical Framework for
Bilingual Education Based on Principles from Cognitive Psychology, in CRITICAL PERSP. ON BILINGUAL
EDUC. RES. 11 (Raymond V. Padilla & Alfredo H. Benavides eds., 1992).
166. Id. at 13.
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learned and available for use in any situation. 67 An issue which has been
widely debated is whether bilinguals have a separate or shared LTM
store. Paul Kolers first framed the issue as the "independence" versus
the "interdependence" of the individual's two languages. 16 Based on
Kolers' initial ideas about the bilingual's memory system, competing
hypotheses emerged. The interdependence, or common-storage, hypothesis
held that bilingual memory is a single system in which information is
stored as "a complex set of attributes or tags that enables the bilingual
to store non-semantic information such as modality, frequency, spatial
' 69
and temporal aspects, and type of language (e.g., English, Korean).'
The independence model, on the other hand, holds that there are separate
and independent language-specific stores that are linked via a "transformation mechanism."' 7 °
Despite these differences, both models recognize the presence of a
mechanism that allows the bilingual speaker to switch from one system
to the other, but the models differ in where they locate this system.
In the common-store model, this switch is situated before semantic
memory. The switching mechanism is set to whichever language is
being processed and the information is sent to a common memory
store. In the separate-store model information in each language is
language and
stored separately unless it is required in the opposite
71
is then translated via the translation mechanism.'
The "dual coding" model has been proposed in an effort to resolve
the controversy between the common storage and the separate storage
models. Dual-coding assumes memory and cognition are served by separate
symbolic systems; one system dealing with verbal representation (logogens),
the other with nonverbal representation (imagens).172 The two systems are
presumably independent but interconnected. Allan Paivio and Wallace
Lambert suggest that bilinguals have two verbal representations, one for
each of the languages, and a representation imagery system. 73 Though
independent and 74separate, the three systems are interconnected at the
referential level. 1
While the dual-coding model represents a promising alternative to the
common-store and separate store models, it focuses on access to representation rather than the organization of memory.'75 Therefore, it fails
to explain the mechanisms through which bilinguals process information
in one or both languages.17 6 "It is limited only to the representation in

167. Id.
168. See Paul A. Kolers, Bilingualism and Information Processing, 218 Sci. AM. 78 (Mar. 1968).
169. Padilla & Sung, supra note 165, at 20.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 21-22.
173. Allan Paivio & Wallace Lambert, Dual Coding and Bilingual Memory,20 J. VERBAL LEARNNo
& VERBAL BEHAV. 532, 538 (Oct. 1981).
174. Padilla & Sung, supra note 165, at 22.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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LTM and does not explain the full processing of information from stimulus
7
representation to eventual LTM storage and retrieval.'
The type of information transfer that typically occurs in an Englishonly context, such as working on an assembly line or translating for
clients at the courthouse, does not entail LTM storage of information.
Rather the processing of the stimulus is apt to be at the sensory memory
(SM) level before it is stored even in short term memory. Thus, when
Hector Garcia was asked by another Mexican-American employee about
the availability of an item and he responded in Spanish that the article
was not available, this sensory stimulus (the substance of the question
and the language it was in) was certainly not stored in LTM and, if not
especially salient, probably not yet transferred from sensory memory to
STM.
Though research on bilingualism is important and long overdue, much
of this psychological research is not directly relevant to the analysis of
English-only rules in the workplace. One of the problems with such
research is that it has focused on the characteristics of bilingual individuals
without considering how social or situational contexts affect bilingual
communication and expression. A second, related problem, is that research
on bilingualism has been concerned primarily with language acquisition
and learning, rather than with linguistic expression and interaction among
bilingual speakers. In other words, the research focuses more on how
ohe acquires a second language than on how one maintains bilingual
communication once the language is acquired. Someone like Hector Garcia
who was born and raised in the United States is likely to have acquired
both languages simultaneously, rather than alternately. Finally, existing
models-whether of the common-store, separate, or dual-coding varietytreat the learning and usage of two languages as separate processes. They
fail to consider the extent to which bilinguals are able to integrate two
separate grammars and language systems.
Sociolinguists have variously defined "code-switching" as "the juxtaposition of passage of speech belonging to two different grammatical
systems or subsystems within the same exchange,"'' 7 or as "the alternation
of grammatical rules, drawn from two different languages, which occurs
within sentence boundaries."' 7 9 Much of the early literature in the area
of language contact studies adopted a deficit view of code-switching,
regarding it either as a form of linguistic borrowing or interference.1 0
Weinreich, for example, saw interference as "[t]hose instances of deviation
from the norms of either language which occur in the speech of bilinguals

177. Id. at 22-23.
178. JENNY COOK-GUMPERZ & JOHN i. GUMPERZ, THE SOCIOLINGUISTIC SIGNIFICANCE OF CONVERSATIONAL CODE-SWITCHING I (Univ. of Calif. Papers on Language & Context, Working Paper
#46, 1976).
179. Rosario C. Gingras, Problems in the Description of Spanish-English Intrasentential CodeSwitching, in SOUTHWEST AREAL LINGUISTICS 167 (Garland D. Bills ed., 1974).
180. Adalberto Aguirre, Jr., The Sociolinguistic Basis For Code Switching in Bilingual Discourse
and in Bilingual Instruction in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE ON BILINGUAL EDUCATION RESOURCES 70, 73
(Raymond V. Padilla & Alfredo H. Benavides, eds., 1992).
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as a result of their familiarity with more than one language . . . .
Such linguistic interference was viewed either as a transitional stage from
the regular use of one language to the use of another, or as some sort
of "linguistic diffusion.' ' 8 2 According to Adalberto Aguirre, one result
of the tendency to classify code-switching as interference has been confusion about the prevalence of code-switching in bilingual speech and
the function of code-switching in bilingual communication. 3
More recent studies have begun to interpret code-switching not as
deficient or transitional behavior, but as a linguistic adaptation by bilingual
speakers. According to Hans Dua,
Code-switching as a process of language use implies that the individual has the competence of two codes at his disposal and that
he can use them alternately, consciously or unconsciously, in accordance with linguistic and extra-linguistic constraints to achieve certain
communicative goals and convey sociosemantic connotations. This
further implies that the two codes are kept distinct whether the
that the speaker
competence in them is balanced or non-balanced and
84
can identify the elements of the respective codes.1
Sociolinguists have observed that code-switching entails the co-existence
of two separate grammars with two general language systems and that
code-switching is an intrasentential process." 5 Bilingual speakers appear
to have established a subset of grammatical rules or knowledge that
permits them to code-switch effectively. A study of bilingual MexicanAmericans conducted by Gumperz and Herndndez-Chdvez found adverbial
constructions such as "Vamos next week," but they could not be switched
when used as interrogatives, "When Vamos?" In addition, they found
that,
a code switch may occur at a noun phrase only after a determiner,
"Se lo di a mi grandfather," but not as "Se lo di a my grandfather";
an adjective, "Es very friendly,"
and an adverb may be switched 1before
6
but not, "Es very amistoso."' 8
Research shows not only that bilingual speakers can rank the level of
acceptability of code-switched sentences but that some types of codeswitching are more acceptable than others. 87 Moreover, this same research
shows that a bilingual speaker's ability to evaluate the acceptability of
code-switched sentences is directly related to the person's proficiency in

181. URIEL WEINREICH, LANGUAGES IN CONTACT: FINDINGS AND PROBLEMS 1 (Mouton & Co. N.V.
1968) (1953).
182. For a critique of this view, see Aguirre, supra note 180, at 72-75.
183. Id. at 73.
184. Hans R. Dua, Perspectives on Code-Switching Research, XII INT'L J. DRAVIDIAN LINGUISTICS
136, 136-37 (1984).
185. Aguirre, supra note 180, at 76-77.
186. Id. at 77 (citing J. Gumperz & E. Hernandez-Chavez, Cognitive Aspects of Bilingual Communication, in EL LENGUAJE DE Los CI-CANos: REGIONAL AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LANGUAGE
USED BY MEXICAN AMERICANS 154-63 (E. Hernandez-Chavez, A. Cohen, & A. Beltramno eds., 1975).
187. Id. at 79.
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the two languages.18 8 Research also shows that bilingual speakers use a
combination of the grammatical knowledge from their two languages in
89
processing bilingual speech.
In addition to intrasentential switching, bilinguals often switch from
one language to the next. An early study of bilingual Norwegians found
that they readily switched back and forth between two languages, and
that one respondent switched from Norwegian to English four times in
the course of fifteen minutes.190 Haugen has noted that "speakers will
often be quite unaware that they are switching back and forth; they are
accustomed to having bilingual speakers before them, and know that
whichever language they use ... will be understood." 9' Bilingual speakers
use language situationally and for symbolizing political and social values
so that, according to Weinreich, "[t]he ideal bilingual switches from one
language to the other according to appropriate changes in the speech

situation

....

''192

D.

The Dominant Model of Equality, Feminist Theory, and
Bilingualism
Though this paper has focused on the imposition of English-only rules
in the workplace, it seeks to place such employment practices within a
larger theoretical context. Much discrimination and denial of equal protection is permitted because conceptions of equality emanate from a
liberal model which treats equality as sameness.
A number of feminist scholars have been critical of this view, arguing
that it works to perpetuate inequality. 193 Krieger and Cooney, for example,
have critically examined the "Miller-Wohl" controversy over whether
legal arguments can be offered to justify special treatment of women in
a pregnancy context without simultaneously endorsing legal principles that
would permit less favorable treatment of women in other contexts.' 94
They argue that in some instances, including pregnancy-related disabilities,
equal treatment of men and women may produce inequality. 195
"The liberal model of sexual equality is based on two fundamental
assumptions.'1 96 First, the liberal model assumes that there are no "real"
or essential differences between the sexes that are not illusory, or the

188. Id.
189. Evelyn P. Altenberg & Helen Smith Cairns, The Effects of Phonotactic Constraints on
Lexical Processing in Bilingual and Monolingual Subjects, 22 J. VERBAL. LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV.
174, 187 (Apr. 1983).
190. EINAR HAUGEN, THE NORWEGIAN LANGUAGE IN AMERICA 65 (1969).
191. Id.
192. WEINREICH, supra note 181, at 73.
193. A full discussion of feminist theory is obviously well beyond the scope of this paper. My
intent simply is to use feminist writing as a point of departure for my analysis of English-only
rules in the workplace. For a more extensive discussion see AIfredo Mirand6, "Revenge of the
Nerds," or Postmodern "Colored Folk?": A Critique of Critical Race Theory and Legal Narratives
5-15 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
194. Krieger & Cooney, supra note 10, at 513.
195. Id. at 515.
196. Id. at 538.
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result of faulty sex-role stereotyping. 97 There is no condition or experience
that women have that does not have a cross-sex analogue. People are
disabled for a number of reasons, including pregnancy, but disabilities
are treated the same. Second, the liberal view assumes that because men
and women are essentially the same, "once all vestiges of disparate
treatment are removed, men and women . . will achieve equal status

through individual freedom of choice and equal competition in the social
and economic marketplace." 198
An extreme and grotesque' 99 manifestation of the liberal model is found
in the equal protection analysis in Geduldig v. Aiello,2° where the Supreme
Court held that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from a
state administered disability insurance plan was not sex discrimination
or a violation of the equal protection clause. In the infamous footnote
20, the court reasoned:
The California insurance program does not exclude anyone from
benefit eligibility because of gender but merely removes one physical
condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities....
The program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant
women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively
female, the second includes members of both sexes. The fiscal and
actuarial
benefits of the program thus accrue to members of both
20
sexes. '

One of the most influential and controversial proponents of a feminist
jurisprudence is Catharine MacKinnon.2 0 2 MacKinnon is critical of both
the liberal "equal rights" theory and Carol Gilligan's "different voice"
approach,203 arguing that the first does not go far enough and the second
goes too far. The equal rights theory permits women to compete in a
game with man made rules where they are destined to fail. She asks:
"Why should you have to be the same as a man to get what a man
gets simply because he is one? ' ' 204 While Gilligan's depiction of gender
differences in morality and world view, as illustrated by the parable of
Amy and Jake, may be accurate, such differences are what one would

197. Id. at 538.
198. Id.
199. Krieger and Cooney describe the court's reasoning as "somewhat grotesque." Id. at 534. 1
agree, but would add that it is simply grotesque.
200. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
201. Id.at 496, n.20.
202. See MACKINNON, supra note 10, at 32.
203. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 25 (1982). Gilligan's book provided the theoretical
and ideological underpinnings for much feminist jurisprudence, especially the more moderate "different voice" branch. Gilligan argued that there is support for the view that there are essential
differences in the world views and moral reasoning capacities of men and women. Men, she argued,
are more analytical, concrete, and have a preference for detached, objective, and relational reasoning
whereas women, Gilligan contends, are less analytical, subjective, and more connected to others
and ontextual in their reasoning and moral judgment. She uses the parable of "Amy" and "Jake,"
two eleven-year-old sixth graders from similar educational and social class backgrounds, to illustrate
these gender-based differences.
204. MACKINNON, supra note 10, at 37.
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expect in a situation of subordination and are not necessarily attributable
to' essential gender differences. 2 5
According to MacKinnon, it is impossible to determine a woman's
"true essence," until such time as women are liberated. But in the interim,
to glorify such differences, as Gilligan does, not only serves to internalize
stereotypes but to disable women and preclude effective change on their
behalf. "For women to affirm difference, when difference means dominance, as it does with gender, means to affirm the qualities and characteristics of powerlessness. ' '2 06 Women, according to MacKinnon, have
valued "care" because men have evaluated them according to the care
they provide. 20 7 Women think relationally because their existence has been
defined in relation to men.208 Moreover, being powerless means much
more than speaking in a "different voice." It often means being silenced
and not speaking at all. 2 09 MacKinnon's point simply is that "the damage
of sexism is real, and reifying that into differences is an insult to our
possibilities.' '210
According to MacKinnon, conceptions of sexual equality emanate from
a male perspective of equality which frees women to be like men. In
addition, MacKinnon believes that the difference approach errs in viewing
sexism as a question of difference, or inaccurate classification of individuals, rather than as the forced imposition of gender hierarchies.
If differentiation into classifications, in itself, is discrimination, as it
is in difference doctrine, the use of law to change group-based social
inequalities becomes problematic, even contradictory ....

If differ-

entiation is discrimination, affirmative action, and any legal change
in social inequality, is discrimination-but the existing social differentiations which constitute the inequality are not? ...

[In the view

that equates. differentiation with discrimination, changing an unequal
status quo is discrimination, but allowing it to exist is not.21'
One of the major criticisms leveled by feminists at the liberal model
is that its vision of equality is based on the assumption of homogeneity
so that equality for women will be attained by being treated the same
as men.2 12 Drawing on Elizabeth Wolgast's "bivalent model"

of sexual

205. There is considerable overlap between different voice theory and Elizabeth Wolgast's "bivalent" view, discussed and critiqued by Krieger and Cooney, supra note 10, at 557.

206.

MAcKINNON,

supra note 10, at 39.

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 42.
212. It should be noted that MacKinnon's dominance approach has been criticized by women of
color who contend that it is based on a white perspective that ignores racial differences in the
experiences of women. Angela Harris, for example, notes that despite the power of MacKinnon's
theory it is somehow "flawed by its essentialism." Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN L. REv. 581, 591 (1990). Dominance theory is critical of differences theory,
but it too assumes that despite differences among women, beneath these differences there is an
"essential woman." This essentialism enables MacKinnon to ignore differences among women in
class, race, and sexual orientation. "In her search for what is essential womanhood, however,
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equality and on Ann Scales' "incorporationist" view, Krieger and Cooney
point to the need to develop a feminist jurisprudence that accords special
rights to women without perpetuating stereotypic assumptions about differences between the sexes. 213 Wolgast's bivalent model identifies two
types of rights: "equal" rights which are afforded all members of society,
and "special" rights which are recognized among subgroups. Though
every individual is assumed, for example, "to have an 'equal' right of
access to public buildings," all persons are not equally able to exercise
this right. 21 4 A disabled person in a wheelchair will not be able to exercise
the right, unless society recognizes a "special" right of handicapped
persons to have a ramp that will provide the person access to the building.
Similarly, if society recognizes an equal right of all members of society
to bodily integrity, because women have the capacity to become pregnant,
they will be denied that right, "[u]nless women are accorded the special
15
right to abortion."
The danger in the bivalent model, according to Krieger and Cooney,
is that permitting special "positive" treatment based on essential differences also opens up the possibility of special "negative" treatment based
on presumed differences, and, like Gilligan's "different-voice" approach,
has the potential for perpetuating sex role stereotyping based not on
essential differences but on normative considerations. 2 6 This problem can,
however, be obviated somewhat by adopting Scales' incorporationist approach, which applies a "limiting principle" to Wolgast's bivalent model. 217
The limiting principle is that the special rights of women would be limited
to sex-specific conditions such as pregnancy and breastfeeding. "Under
the incorporationist view, normative differences between the sexes cannot
' 21 8
serve as the basis for special rights or burdens.
Like traditional conceptions of sexual equality, English-only rules are
based on a liberal view that seeks to attain equality by treating bilingual
speakers the same as monolingual speakers. The problem of course is
that bilingual persons are not the same. They are different, and are often
hired because of this difference. They are different not only from White
people but also from protected classes for whom language is not a primary
basis of difference or discrimination. If equality is to be attained, the
21 9
law must reflect and accommodate this difference.
MacKinnon rediscovers white womanhood and introduces it as universal truth" so that AfricanAmerican women "are white women, only more so." Id. at 592. According to Harris, women of
color disappear in dominance theory and what remains are white women with an added burden.
Id.
213. Krieger & Cooney, supra note 10, at 561.
214. Id. at 557.
215. Id. at 561.
216. Id. at 563.
217. Ann Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375, 435 (1980-81).
218. Krieger & Cooney, supra note 10, at 563.
219. Stephen Cutler argues that the current approach to enforcement of Title VII renders the
prohibition against discrimination based on national origin virtually meaningless because it permits
employers to discriminate against qualified applicants of a particular national origin group and to
hire more assimilated members of the same group. He suggests adopting a "trait-based approach"
to national origin claims. Stephen M. Cutler, A Trait-Based Approach to National Origin Claims
Under Title VII, 94 YALE L. J. 1164, 1166 (1985).
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What I propose, in a sense, is that language is for some groups what
pregnancy is to women, and that equal treatment is bound to perpetuate
inequality. But, unlike pregnancy, bilingualism is a more permanent
220
condition. Under the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),
qualified individuals with disabilities are protected from discrimination
on the basis of the disability in regard to job application procedures,
hiring, advancement, compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 22' The employer is also required
to make a reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental
limitation of an otherwise qualified individual which may include making
existing facilities used by employees readily accessible and job restructuring
such as modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,
training materials or policies, and the provision of qualified readers or
interpreters. 222 Disability is defined as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities
such an impairment, or being regarded
of such individual, (B) a record of
'22
as having such an impairment. 1
In Fragante v. City of Honolulu,224 Miguel Fragante, a sixty year-old
retired Filipino military officer, brought a civil rights action against the
city and county of Honolulu. Fragante had applied for a clerk's job
with the city and county, and was not hired even though he had placed
first among 721 applicants on the civil service examination. 225 In denying
his claim, the Ninth Circuit held that he was passed over for the job
because of the negative effect that his thick accent would have on his
with the general public, not merely because he
ability to communicate
226
had an accent.
What is interesting is that had Fragante's Filipino accent been defined
as a disability, the outcome would undoubtedly have been very different.
I submit that the historical experience supports treating Spanish bilingualism in the United States as a disability. 227 Though knowledge of more
than one language is generally considered a critical component of a good
liberal arts education and it was traditionally required that persons demonstrate fluency in a second language before they were granted a Ph.D.,
speaking Spanish in the United States has been devalued historically.
"No Spanish" rules were the norm in schools throughout the Southwest

220. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213 (1988).
221. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(a).
222. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
223. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
224. 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1989).
225. Id. at 593.
226. Id. Both persons who interviewed Fragante orally, Kuwahara and McCandless, said they
had difficulty understanding him because of his thick Filipino accent. Id.
227. This paper has focused on English-only rules, not on discrimination based on real or perceived
accents, but there is evidence that suggests having a Mexican accent is less desirable than having
a European accent. See, e.g., Michael M. Pacheco, Does My Spanish Bother You?: Language Based
Discrimination as a Pretext for National Origin Discrimination, 11 CMcANO-LATINo L. REV. 53
(1991).
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and "Spanish detention" was a widely used punishment in the schools.228
. Case law illustrates that speaking Spanish on the job is often treated
as a deviant or surreptitious activity. The most blatant example is, perhaps,
the prohibition of "Mesican talk" in Saucedo v. Brothers Well Service,
Inc., but in other cases it is interesting to note that bilinguals are described
as being "caught" and "overheard" speaking Spanish. Furthermore, there
is language in these cases stating that they were "capable" of speaking
English but "voluntarily" chose- to speak Spanish. This suggests that
there is a considerable stigma associated with being bilingual. It is also
significant that some of the cases, like Garcia v. Gloor, make reference
to the "educational" and "intellectual" level of bilinguals. Garcia, for
example, is depicted as having "completed the first semester of the tenth
grade in Texas public schools.

' 229

In Saucedo, the Mexican who protested

the firing of Saucedo and the "no Spanish" rule, Steve Perez, is described
by the court as "an intelligent and fairly well educated Mexican-American
''230

Consequently, there is considerable justification for treating Spanish
bilingualism as a disability. It is certainly a relatively permanent "physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities." It can affect performance in school and employment in
a monolingual setting; there is generally a record of the impairment
(school records, job applications); and bilinguals are regarded by others
as having the impairment. Despite the parallels between the experiences
of bilinguals and the experiences of persons with other disabilities, including sex-linked disabilities, there are also important differences. One
important, ironic, difference is that whereas disabilities law requires accommodation to compensate for a disabling condition, bilingual persons
are not deficient. It is a situation where the disability comes from the
"disabled" person being more, rather than less qualified than the monolingual person. In addition to their normal duties, bilingual clerks and
bilingual salespersons are required to serve the monolingual public. The
accommodation comes because they are expected to do more, not less,
than other employees. English-only rules appear to based on a warped
conception of equality which uses the lowest common denominator as
the norm and treats those who exceed it as deficient.
E.

The Antidiscrimination Principle and English-Only
In what has emerged as a classic statement on civil rights and equal
protection, Paul Brest articulated the "antidiscrimination principle," which
he defined as a "general principle disfavoring classifications and other
decisions and practices that depend on the race (or ethnic origin) of the

228.
229.
230.
clearly

See STEINER, supra note 2, at 209.
Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d. 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1980).
Saucedo v. Brothers Well Serv., Inc., 464 F. Supp. 919, 922 (S.D. Tex. 1979). The implication
is that he is an exception to the rule.
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parties affected." ' 2a ' Brest argues that a principle disfavoring racial clas-

sifications is warranted under the Fourteenth Amendment regardless of
the specific intent of the framers. Support for the antidiscrimination
principle is warranted because it rests on fundamental values that are
widely accepted in our society. Also, the "text and history of the [Equal
Protection] clause are vague and ambiguous and cannot, in any event,
infuse the antidiscrimination principle with moral force
or justify its
' 232
extension to novel circumstances and new beneficiaries.
Brest's seemingly expansive vision of the Fourteenth Amendment, equal
protection, and antidiscrimination law is consistent with the goals of this
paper. I propose that English-only rules are inconsistent with the antidiscrimination principle and the Fourteenth Amendment because they are
derived from a liberal model of equality which is based on the homogeneity
assumption and treats equality as sameness. They are derived from a
flawed model that is doomed to perpetuate inequality because it assumes
that equality for women will be attained by treating them like menwith an added burden. The liberal model also assumes that equality will
be achieved by treating protected classes the same as other groups. A
final flaw in this view is that the homogeneity principle posits internal
homogeneity among protected classes. The liberal model assumes that all
suspect groups are the same and fails to recognize historical and social
differences within protected classes.
The Fourteenth Amendment, equal protection analysis, and antidiscrimination principles are derived largely from the history of slavery and
were designed to eliminate the vestiges of slavery and racial animus
directed against African-Americans during Reconstruction.
A century after the Civil War, our nation was committed to the
antidiscrimination principle. Of the Reconstruction amendments, only
the fifteenth explicitly embodied it. In the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
however, Congress read the antidiscrimination principle into the thirteenth amendment; and the Supreme Court has construed the amorphous language of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to hold that racial classifications are "constitutionally
'
suspect" and subject to "the most rigid scrutiny."233
Brest's antidiscrimination principle sees "race-dependent" decisions as
irrational because they assume that members of one race are less worthy
than members of another race.
However, if one examines Brest's theory more carefully, it is clear
that despite its lofty rhetoric, the antidiscrimination principle too is
consistent with the liberal model of equality. Like the liberal model, the
antidiscrimination principle endorses the homogeneity principle. The antidiscrimination principle is consistent with the liberal model because it

231.
(1976)
232.
233.

Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1
(citation omitted).
Id. at 5.
Id. at I (citations omitted).
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"disfavors race-dependent decisions and conduct," especially if such decisions and conduct work to disadvantage members of protected classes,
without acknowledging the need for race-conscious decisions that may
serve to eliminate discrimination. 2 4 Thus Brest states: "I leave open
whether the antidiscrimination principle disfavors so-called 'benign' racedependent practices-practices designed to benefit, and that seem in fact
to benefit, the members of traditionally disadvantaged minorities. ' 235 The
antidiscrimination principle is also consistent with the liberal model because it assumes a homogeneity of experience among protected classes.
While recognizing that the antidiscrimination principle can be extended
to include a variety of other traits such as alienage, illegitimacy, and
sex, Brest's inquiry focuses exclusively on race.
The focus on race is consistent with the prevailing conception in the
liberal view, that "discrete and insular minorities" are those whose
subordinate status is based on permanent and immutable characteristics
like race and skin color. The equal protection doctrine and antidiscrimination principles have found it more difficult to address discriminatory
treatment based on traits such as language which are presumed to be
more mutable than race. In this paper, I have argued that for bilingual
Latino and Asian groups in the United States, language is essentially an
immutable characteristic, like race or skin color is for other groups. I
am not suggesting that race and skin color are not also important bases
of discrimination but, rather, that in addition to racial discrimination,
such groups are often subjected to language and accent discrimination.
I am also suggesting that English-only rules can often serve as a pretext
for racial and national origin discrimination and as a mechanism not
only for expressing but for validating racial/ethnic animus toward a
23 6
particular group.

If we are to adopt a more expansive view of equal protection and to
fully endorse the antidiscrimination principle, we must discard traditional
conceptions of equality and begin to develop a vision of equal protection
and civil rights that is truly capable of extending to novel circumstances
and new beneficiaries. An important first step is to begin to recognize
the extent to which much discrimination and unequal treatment are
permitted and socially sanctioned because they are based on traits which
may be less visible than race but are no less permanent or immutable.

234. Id. at 6.
235. Id. at I n.l.
236. Jos6 Solarez, City Manager of El Mirage, a city of 5,001 that is eighty percent Latino, has
instructed city employees to continue using Spanish when necessary in doing the city's work. The
order stands in defiance of Arizona's controversial English-only amendment, Article 28 of the
Arizona Constitution, which was passed by voters in November, 1988. El Mirage Snubs EnglishOnly Law: Employees Told Spanish Allowed, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Feb. 9, 1994, at B4.

